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likely to prove devastating in the future. Nonetheless, the relevant harms to animals have
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species are valued solely by reference to human preferences, consideration of animal welfare
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INTRODUCTION
Polar bears depend heavily on Arctic sea ice for their survival.
When sea ice breaks up and drifts as a result of polar warming, the
bears must move northward to find stable platforms. Hunting becomes more difficult, because the bears are rarely successful in finding
food on open water. Pregnant females, who must leave the ice to find
their preferred terrestrial den areas, are forced to swim great distances
and to fast for long periods, as the ice drifts farther from land. Even if
pregnancy is successful, the bear cubs—raised in suboptimal habitats
with malnourished mothers—are most unlikely to flourish.
Harlequin frogs are a vibrantly colorful and active genus of frog in
Central and South America. They suffered widespread extinction in
the twentieth century—67% of 110 species—despite attempts at habitat protection. The culprit is apparently a pathogenic outbreak triggered by climate change. The chytrid fungus grows on the frogs’
moist skin and eats away at their epidermis and teeth, before ultimately killing them. Tellingly, approximately 80% of the lost harle1
quin species disappeared after an unusually warm preceding year.
The British ring ouzel, a shy species of thrush with a high chirping
call, has been in decline for most of the last hundred years. Up to
58% of the population disappeared from 1988 through 1999, and as
few as 6000 mating pairs are left. High temperatures and precipitation in the preceding year have been linked to subsequent declines in
the ring ouzel population. Biologists speculate that temperature and
2
rainfall extremes have led to a decrease in food availability.
These are but three examples of the potential impact of anthropogenic climate change on animal life and welfare. While the current
3
effects of climate change on human beings are disputed, there is little
4
question that the impact on animal life is already substantial. Projec-

1

J. Alan Pounds et al., Widespread Amphibian Extinctions from Epidemic Disease Driven
by Global Warming, 439 NATURE 161, 163 (2006).
2
Colin M. Beale et al., Climate Change May Account for the Decline in British Ring
Ouzels Turdus Torquatus, 75 J. ANIMAL ECOLOGY 826, 827-28 (2006).
3
Some studies suggest that up to 150,000 human lives are already lost annually
due to climate change. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Patz et al., Impact of Regional Climate Change
on Human Health, 438 NATURE 310, 313 (2005) (citing a World Health Organization
study).
4
See, e.g., Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate
Change Impacts Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37, 41 (2003) (discussing an analysis
of over 300 species that shows significant changes caused by climate warming); Terry L.
Root et al., Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants, 421 NATURE 57, 57
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tions into the future are much bleaker. One particularly dramatic
study, published in Nature in 2004, suggests that 15% to 37% of all
species—potentially millions—could be committed to extinction by
5
2050 as a result of anthropogenic climate change.
Yet conventional economic analysis of climate change has virtually
6
ignored these effects on nonhuman life. A highly influential study by
economists William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer treats the welfare cost
7
of species loss as too small or uncertain to be accurately quantified.
Bjørn Lomborg’s well-known analysis of the problem simply fails to
8
discuss animals at all. Nicholas Stern’s massive study makes little effort to come to terms with the effects of climate change on animals,
notwithstanding its emphasis on the omissions in previous treat9
ments. Richard Tol recognizes the impact of climate change on
natural ecosystems, but arbitrarily stipulates a fixed $50 per person
willingness to pay to “protect natural habitats” regardless of the antici10
pated impact.
The consequence of these omissions and stipulations is almost certainly to underestimate, by a large margin, the monetary cost of climate change. Consider the fact that in 2004 alone, federal, state, and
local governments in the United States spent over $1.4 billion to protect around 1340 entities (a mere thousandth of the threatened loss
from climate change) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and
expenditures have increased dramatically in recent years as more enti-

(2003) (“[T]he balance of evidence from . . . studies strongly suggests that a significant
impact of global warming is already discernible in animal and plant populations.”).
5
Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145
(2004).
6
Climate change will harm all forms of nonhuman life in natural systems. We focus on animals, however, because harm to animals will comprise the lion’s share of the
social welfare costs stemming from destruction of natural systems.
7
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 85-87 (2000).
8
BJØRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL
STATE OF THE WORLD 290-300 (2001) (omitting animals from a discussion “of the consequences of global warming”).
9
NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 169-73,
173-88 (2007).
A prepublication version of the Stern Review is available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/indepenent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/
stern_review_report.cfm.
10
Richard S.J. Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, 21 ENVT’L. & RESOURCE ECON. 47, 54-55 (2002). Tol himself notes the importance of better analysis in
the area. Id. at 55.

1698

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1695

11

ties have been added to the endangered list. Moreover, an expenditure measure may well underestimate the true value of endangered
species protection, since most of the costs of the ESA are compliance
and opportunity costs, stemming from the inability of landowners or
governments to engage in otherwise valuable projects. One study estimates that the true annual cost of the ESA (and thus its implied
minimum value) is six times greater than nominal government ex12
penditures —implying an annual figure of $8.4 billion for 2004.
A skeptic might try to justify the neglect of animal life in climate
change policy analysis in two ways. First, the value of nonhuman life—
and the ESA—is heavily debated, and any particular figure will be easy
to question. Second, scientific and conceptual uncertainty about climate and natural systems has clouded any attempt at quantification.
In 1996, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
wrote:
Perhaps the category in which losses from climate change could be
among the largest, yet where past research has been the most limited, is
that of ecosystem impacts. Uncertainties arise both because of the unknown character of ecosystem impacts, and because of the difficulty of
assessing these impacts from a socioeconomic point of view and translat13
ing them into welfare costs.

In this Article, we contend that neither of these reasons can justify
the failure to take account of the effects of climate change on animals.
First, animal life matters, both for its own sake and because human beings care about it. As noted above, the United States spends billions
of dollars to protect a relatively small number of species under the
ESA. Contingent valuation studies consistently show high willingness
to pay for the protection of animals. Other recent studies have suggested highly significant instrumental value for biodiversity in areas
such as agriculture and medical research. Second, the scientific uncertainty over the impact of climate change on natural systems is rap11

U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE ENDANGERED
THREATENED SPECIES EXPENDITURES: FISCAL YEAR 2004, at ii, 1, 7 tbl.c (2006),
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/expenditures/reports/FWS%
20Endangered%20Species%202004%20Expenditures%20Report.pdf.
12
RANDY T. SIMMONS & KIMBERLY FROST, PROP. & ENV’T RESEARCH CTR., ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIES: THE TRUE COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 16 (2004),
available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/esa_costs.pdf.
13
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP III,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 200
(James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter IPCC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS].
AND
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idly diminishing. Many of the most important discoveries have been
made only in the past few years, so previous analysts may have been
right to assume that scientific knowledge was insufficient to permit
precise judgments about damages or causality. But the most extreme
claims of causal ambiguity are no longer tenable. While it is an understatement to say that the magnitude of the effects of climate change
on animals is still debated, the direction and general significance of
those effects are not. Climate change will impose enormous costs on
nonhuman life, and ignoring these costs while evaluating climate
change policy is no longer excusable.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys the recent scientific literature that identifies the potential impact of climate change
on animals and other nonhuman life. Part II explores why and how
animal welfare might be counted in the evaluation of climate change
regulation. Part III offers a partial and highly tentative estimate of the
monetized loss from the impact of climate change on nonhuman life.
Even under conservative assumptions, focused solely on extinctions
and excluding other kinds of animal suffering and death, we estimate
that this loss will run into the hundreds of billions annually. Despite the
tentativeness of the particular number, the unambivalent conclusion is
that the prevailing estimates of the costs of climate change must be
dramatically increased.
I. SOME EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The fact of anthropogenic climate change is no longer in serious
14
dispute.
Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have risen to a
15
level probably unseen in millions of years. Global temperatures have
increased by 0.6°C in the twentieth century, and have been projected
to increase an additional 1.4°C to 5.8°C for the period from 1990 to
2100. Sea levels rose by 0.10 to 0.20 m in the twentieth century, and
are expected to rise an additional 0.09 to 0.88 m in the next hundred

14

See, e.g., ANDREW E. DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 76 (2006) (“We can conclude with high confidence that
human greenhouse-gas emissions are the dominant cause of [the] rapid recent warming.”); JOHN HOUGHTON, GLOBAL WARMING: THE COMPLETE BRIEFING 9 (3d ed. 2004)
(explaining that human activities are causing a warmer climate); IPCC, WORKING
GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 5-9 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds.,
2001) [hereinafter IPCC, SCIENTIFIC BASIS] (reviewing the effects of human activities
on climate change).
15
R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 573, 576 (2006).
OF
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years. Extreme weather events may begin to occur with increasing
17
frequency. Perhaps most ominously, some scientists have hypothesized that disruptions to the ocean’s thermohaline circulation due to
warming of polar waters might perversely trigger an abrupt and mas18
sive cooling event.
These climatic shifts are expected to have a series of negative effects on human society. Agriculture will suffer from temperature
changes and extreme weather events. Human health will decline, as
cases of heat stress increase and diseases such as malaria spread to
previously inaccessible regions. Cities such as Venice might be dam19
aged or destroyed by changes in sea level.
There is significant debate, however, about the proper accounting
for these potential harms, especially as they pertain to the United
States. William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, for example, report that
the net cost of gradual climate change to the United States, under
moderate scenarios, might be “close to zero” because of adaptive re20
sponses.
Robert Mendelsohn and James Neumann conclude that
climate change will create net benefits in the United States—largely by
21
boosting agricultural production.
In contrast, Samuel Fankhauser
and Richard Tol both find that climate change will cause more than
22
$60 billion in annual costs to the United States. Some estimates are
23
much higher. The most recent IPCC panel took a quite different

16

IPCC, SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 14, at 664, 665 fig.11.9, 671.
STERN, supra note 9, at 59, 99-101, 107, 151; David R. Easterling et al., Climate
Extremes: Observations, Modeling, and Impacts, 289 SCIENCE 2068, 2068 (2000).
18
R.B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, 299 SCIENCE 2005, 2008 (2003).
19
NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 7, at 85; see also IPCC, WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICIAL SCIENCE BASIS 7 (2007) (predicting a significant
rise in the sea level), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/
AR4WG1_SPM.pdf.
20
NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 7, at 97.
21
Robert Mendelsohn & James E. Neumann, Synthesis and Conclusions, in THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 315, 321 (Robert Mendelsohn & James E. Neumann eds., 1999); see also Olivier Deschênes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Profits and
Random Fluctuations in Weather 26 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 04-26, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564722.
22
SAMUEL FANKHAUSER, VALUING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE
GREENHOUSE 55 tbl.3.15 (1995); Richard S.J. Tol, The Damage Costs of Climate Change
Toward More Comprehensive Calculations, 5 ENVT’L. & RESOURCE ECON. 353, 355 tbl.1
(1995); see also STERN, supra note 9, at 130 (noting that the impact on U.S. GDP may
range from a 1.2% loss to a 1% gain).
23
Claudia Kemfert, Global Climate Protection: Immediate Action Will Avert High Costs,
1 DIW WEEKLY REP. 135, 135 (2005) (predicting global damages of $20 trillion by
17
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approach: by shifting its focus from evaluation of costs to mitigation
of costs, the panel implicitly assumed that the impact of climate
24
change justified attempts to mitigate its effects regardless of the costs.
Notably missing from the debate about the costs of climate
change, however, has been an accounting of its potential impact on
nonhuman life. As noted above, this is in part due to scientific uncertainty. In 1996, the IPCC emphasized the “unknown character” of po25
tential ecosystem impacts. A string of recent studies, however, has
served to reduce this uncertainty.
Consider one finding: a global pattern of “poleward” shifts in
26
habitat range has emerged across ecosystems. As temperatures have
increased globally, species have been forced to move to cooler regions; climate change thus acts as a source of human-induced habitat
loss. A recent study found that climate change caused an average 6.1
km per-decade poleward shift in range during the twentieth century.
The previous per-decade shift would be magnified as a result of the
even greater temperature change predicted for the twenty-first century. Of course, if new regions and ecosystems were always perfect and
accessible substitutes for a species’ old habitat, then there would be no
negative impact from such range shifting. (Even if so, many individual
animals would suffer and die.) But shifting is generally imperfect:
climate change can move faster than species, natural or human-made
barriers can prevent shifting, and geographically contiguous habitats
27
are sometimes simply ecologically unsuitable.
Climate change has also caused a chronological shift in “spring
events,” such as migrant arrival and nesting dates. Such events are occurring earlier in the season: a 2.3 day per-decade shift has been
28
demonstrated in a study of 172 species.
As with range shifts, this
change need not have a direct negative effect; going to work an hour
earlier is not intrinsically harmful. But many species have behavioral
patterns, such as migration, that are not linked to seasonal tempera2100); Frank Ackerman & Ian J. Finlayson, The Economics of Inaction on Climate Change:
A Sensitivity Analysis 16-19 (Global Dev. & Envt’l. Inst., Working Paper No. 06-07, 2006)
(concluding that minor changes to assumptions within Nordhaus’s DICE model could
significantly alter the model’s estimated damages from climate change).
24
See LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 301.
25
See IPCC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 200.
26
Parmesan & Yohe, supra note 4, at 41.
27
See Thomas et al., supra note 4, at 147 (discussing the possibility of climaterelated extinction due to the inability of some “species to reach new climatically suitable areas”).
28
See Parmesan & Yohe, supra note 4, at 38.
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ture change. If chronological shifting is either absent or imperfectly
linked to temperature, animals will suffer as they attempt to feed,
breed, and raise their young in excessively warm or rainy seasonal
29
conditions.
Species that cannot adjust to climate change, either geographically or chronologically, face a number of severe difficulties. Heat is a
30
direct stressor of animal physiology. Rising temperatures affect the
31
availability of vegetation and food necessary for survival. Various biological mechanisms affected by temperature—such as nesting and
32
mating—go haywire under abnormal temperature conditions. Diseases triggered by threshold climate events become more common
33
And species must expend more time and energy on
and deadly.
34
thermoregulation when their climatic environment is suboptimal.
Extreme weather events and abrupt climate change also hit animals hard. Even aside from direct storm damage, periods of abnormal
precipitation or drought can have adverse behavioral and physiologi35
cal consequences on species ranging from elephants to turtles. The
most recent incident of abrupt climate change stemming from disruption of the ocean’s thermohaline circulation system—the Younger
Dryas event 10,000 to 11,000 years ago—led to catastrophic ecosystem
36
disruption and mass extinction.
29

See, e.g., Christiaan Both & Marcel E. Visser, Adjustment to Climate Change Is Constrained by Arrival Date in a Long-Distance Migrant Bird, 411 NATURE 296, 297 (2001) (discussing the negative effects of improper chronological shifting on the population of
certain long-distance migrant birds).
30
See William R. Dawson, Physiological Responses of Animals to Higher Temperatures, in
GLOBAL WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 158, 158-62 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas
E. Lovejoy eds., 1992).
31
See Kevin M. Johnston & Oswald J. Schmitz, Wildlife and Climate Change: Assessing
the Sensitivity of Selected Species to Simulated Doubling of Atmospheric CO2, 3 GLOBAL CHANGE
BIOLOGY 531, 539 fig.4 (1997) (illustrating that a doubling of atmospheric CO2 would
have significant indirect effects on species distribution within the United States).
32
See, e.g., M.E. Visser et al., Warmer Springs Lead to Mistimed Reproduction in Great
Tits (Parus Major), 265 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1867, 1869-70 (1998) (discussing the
intensification of “selection for early [egg] laying” in great tits spurred by rising springtime temperatures).
33
See Pounds et al., supra note 1, at 161 (“As temperatures rise, climate fluctuations may cross thresholds for certain pathogens, triggering outbreaks. Many diseases
are expected to become more lethal, or to spread more readily, as the Earth warms.”).
34
Arthur E. Dunham & Karen L. Overall, Population Responses to Environmental
Change: Life History Variation, Individual-Based Models, and the Population Dynamics of
Short-Lived Organisms, 34 AM. ZOOLOGIST 382, 392-93 (1994).
35
Easterling et al., supra note 17, at 2073.
36
See Alley et al., supra note 18, at 2007-08 (“Local extinctions and extensive ecosystem disruptions occurred . . . in fewer than 50 years following the end of the
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One study modeled the expected impact of gradual climate
change on 1103 species (including mammals, birds, reptiles, and insects) and predicted that a remarkable 15% to 37% would be commit37
ted to extinction by 2050. In contrast, over that same period, global
habitat loss—the other major source of ecosystem destruction—leads
to projected extinction ranges from 1% to 29% in the model, with a
38
figure in the lower end of that range being most plausible. That is,
climate change might very well be more destructive to nonhuman life
than all other sources of habitat loss combined. The lead researcher of the
relevant study has stated that “well over a million species could be
39
threatened with extinction as a result of climate change.” In comparison, the 1340 entities protected by the ESA are but a drop in the
biodiversity bucket.
While such projections are becoming increasingly common, a
great deal of scientific uncertainty remains, and the concrete estimates
40
detailed above have been subject to many criticisms.
The models
used to make climate change impact projections, like all models, are
41
simplifications of the real world. The fact of causation is not seriously disputed, but the precise causal mechanisms for observed and
42
anticipated species loss have been difficult to identify. In addition,
the specific regions and species surveyed might not be representative
Younger Dryas cold event . . . .”); Dorothy Peteet, Sensitivity and Rapidity of Vegetational
Response to Abrupt Climate Change, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1359, 1359-60 (2000)
(discussing patterns of vegetational change that followed the Younger Dryas event).
37
Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 145. The 15% projection is associated with low
climate change scenarios for 2050 (i.e., an 0.8°C-1.7°C increase in global temperature). The 37% projection is associated with high climate change scenarios (i.e., an
increase of more than 2.0°C). Id. at 147.
38
Id. at 146.
39
Press Release, Univ. of Leeds, Climate Change Threatens a Million Species
with Extinction (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/media/current/
extinction.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
See, e.g., Richard J. Ladle et al., Dangers of Crying Wolf over Risk of Extinctions, 428
NATURE 799, 799 (2004) (criticizing media coverage of conservation research for its
damaging oversimplification of the scientific findings).
41
An alternative and recently released extinction study takes a different approach
than the Thomas study, using expected loss of vegetation as a proxy for extinction. Jay
R. Malcolm et al., Global Warming and Extinctions of Endemic Species from Biodiversity Hotspots, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 538, 539-50 (2006). The reported extinction range is
less than 1% to 43%. Id. at 542. We focus on the Thomas figures because the Malcolm
study is likely to underreport extinctions, since it analyzes biodiversity effects only when
a vegetation class changes.
42
See J. Alan Pounds & Robert Puschendorf, Clouded Futures, 427 NATURE 107, 108
(2004) (“[F]ew studies have examined how climatic changes might be linked to the
immediate causes of [species decline].”).
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of the global pattern of risk. Finally, as in previous periods of catastrophic ecosystem disruption, new species will eventually move in to
43
replace the old, and some animals are even predicted to benefit
44
from climate change. It is indisputable, however, that many animals
will not be so lucky. Like human beings, animals will be affected by
climate change. But more so than with human beings, the harms to
animals are already apparent, scientifically clear, and of first-order
significance.
The question that remains is how to take account of this harm in
policymaking. Some might be inclined to treat it as irrelevant, but
that inclination would be extremely difficult to defend in principle.
On any plausible view, harm to animals matters, at least to some degree. This judgment is firmly reflected in American law. At the na45
tional level, the ESA is complemented by the Animal Welfare Act,
which is designed to protect a wide range of animals against suffering
and premature death. Every state attempts to accomplish the same
goal through anticruelty laws. We now turn to competing understandings of how, exactly, human societies should account for the interests
of animals.
II. ACCOUNTING FOR ANIMALS
In sketching the effects of climate change, we have emphasized
the loss of species as such. In doing so, we follow the scientific literature. But there are actually two separate interests here. The first is
species loss; the second is the suffering and death of individual animals. Both are important, though not for the same reasons, and the

43

The rate of new speciation, however, is exceedingly low—a mere three species
per year—relative to the anticipated annual losses due to climate change. See J. John
Sepkoski, Jr., Rates of Speciation in the Fossil Record, 353 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SOC’Y. B 315, 315 (1998).
44
For examples of species that might benefit from climate change, see Johnston &
Schmitz, supra note 31, at 537-38. Even if some species benefit from climatic warming,
current extinction rates—even aside from climate change—far exceed baseline rates of
new speciation. Substitution and replacement of animals or species thus will not proceed at a pace that implicates the social costs of climate change within a foreseeable
timeframe. See EDWARD O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 122 (1984) (“[T]he current rate [of
extinction] is still the greatest in recent geological history. It is also much higher than
the rate of production of new species by ongoing evolution, so that the net result is a
steep decline in the world’s standing diversity.”); Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Future of
Biodiversity, 269 SCIENCE 347, 348-49 (1995) (predicting increasing rates of extinction
in the future).
45
7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (2000).
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second deserves independent attention. If one thousand polar bears
or tigers are condemned to extended periods of distress followed by
premature death, their suffering and death would matter even if many
polar bears and tigers remain.
To be sure, the loss of a species is generally counted as an independent harm—in part because of the ecological and medicinal functions that species provide, and in part because human beings want the
46
opportunity to be able to see and enjoy biological diversity. As we
shall see, human beings are willing to pay significant amounts to protect endangered species. But our broader interest here is in harms
done to individual animals. Compare, for example, the loss of the last
five harlequin frogs with the loss of one thousand polar bears. In our
view, the latter loss is far worse, because it involves so much more in
the way of suffering and death. More generally, we believe that much
of social policy has been unduly focused on extinction, to the neglect
of the effects on individual animals. From the moral point of view,
threats to both endangered and nonendangered species should matter to climate change policy.
A. Intrinsic and Instrumental Value
The most straightforward reason to account for animals is that
their interests are intrinsically important. A version of this view was
held by Jeremy Bentham, who compared disregard for animal welfare
to slavery. In 1789, the year of the ratification of America’s Bill of
Rights, Bentham argued:
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by
the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor . . . . [A] full-grown
horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month,
old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the ques47
tion is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?

46

See Gardner M. Brown Jr. & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species
Act, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11-13 (1998) (detailing the private and social benefits derived
from species protection).
47
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 311 n.1 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789).
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In Bentham’s view, utility is what matters, and because animals are capable of suffering, they deserve to count in the social calculus. Utilitarianism is, of course, highly controversial. Perhaps we should accept
48
a form of welfarism not tied to the contested metric of utility, or in49
50
stead emphasize capabilities or even rights. We do not mean here
to endorse any particular theory of why animal life matters. Whatever
the proper account, it is widely agreed that animals should count in
the social calculus. On this point, there is an incompletely theorized
agreement—an agreement in support of judgments and practices,
51
amidst disagreement or uncertainty about what accounts for them.
Millions of Americans treat their dogs and cats as beloved family
members whose interests count independently of the interests of human beings. Many more agree that animal suffering should be reduced, even if the reduction promises no clear gain for humans. Call
this position the intrinsic value approach, because it seeks to protect
animal welfare for its own sake, rather than because animals are a tool
for the ends of human beings.
Of course, many human practices treat animals as worth little or
nothing, or as solely of instrumental value. Consider, for example, the
use of animals for food, and in particular the harm imposed on animals by factory farms—where chickens have their beaks seared off,
cows and pigs are castrated without anaesthetic, and veal calves are
chained down in tiny crates for the duration of their short and miser52
able lives. In many contexts, animal life is valued only to the extent
that human beings benefit from it.
To be sure, social practices cannot dispose of the normative question. Bentham himself believed that the infliction of suffering is a
53
prima facie wrong, not to be justified by its pervasiveness; we agree
with him. But many people continue to act as if some, most, or all
animal life has largely or solely instrumental value, in a way that would
raise questions about the extent of human responsibility for their

48

See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 54-86 (1999).
Martha Nussbaum has applied a capabilities approach to nonhuman animals.
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 346-407 (2006).
50
See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE
DOG? (2000); TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983).
51
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 4-7 (1996)
(outlining the concept and virtues of “incompletely theorized agreements”).
52
See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 95-157 (2d ed. 1990).
53
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49
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deaths and suffering—especially, perhaps, with respect to animals in
distant lands. Even this view, however, acknowledges that animals can
have value—sometimes significant value—and under the instrumental
approach, that value must be included in assessments of social policy.
B. Monetary Valuation
Whether animals are to be valued intrinsically or instrumentally,
difficult issues remain. In the context of human life and health,
American agencies assign monetary values on the basis of private “will54
ingness to pay.” For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) values a human life at about $6.1 million, a figure that comes
55
from real-world markets. Human life has intrinsic as well as instrumental value, and risks to human life can be monetized. In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional safety has a price; market
evidence has been investigated to identify that price. The $6.1 million
figure, known as the value of a statistical life (VSL), is a product of
studies of actual workplace risks, attempting to determine how much
workers and others are paid to assume mortality hazards. Suppose
that people must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate risks of 1 in
10,000. If so, the VSL would be said to be $6 million. Where market
evidence is unavailable, agencies often produce monetary valuations
on the basis of contingent valuation surveys, which ask people how
much they are willing to pay to eliminate or reduce certain risks.
Drawing on market evidence and contingent valuation studies, the
EPA has recently valued a case of chronic bronchitis at $260,000, an
emergency hospital visit for asthma at $9000, a hospital admission for
pneumonia at $13,400, a lost workday at $83, and a specified decrease
56
in vision at $14.
Can similar tools be used to determine the value of a statistical life
for animals? No labor markets are available to provide compensating
differential studies of mortality risk. A contingent valuation study
based on the preferences of animals would be infeasible. Polar bears
do not have money, and they cannot tell us how much they care about
54

See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
RISK 19-21 (1992) (detailing the “willingness to pay” approach and its application
to public versus private contexts).
55
See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61, 75-84 (2004) (discussing the “wagerisk” studies from which the $6.1 million figure was derived).
56
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION 145 tbl.A-3 (2002).
FOR
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Arctic sea ice. We might be tempted to apply existing market and
contingent valuation studies to animals, valuing them at some fraction
of human beings. But if so, an appropriate scaling factor would have
to be determined, and any such factor might well seem arbitrary.
What weight should a frog’s life or health have relative to that of a
wolf, eagle, or human being?
An alternative approach is to value animals by reference to human
preferences, turned into monetary equivalents. Economists typically
make the relevant assessments by inquiring into use and nonuse
value—a division that corresponds closely to the distinction between
instrumental and intrinsic value. Use value includes, for example, the
ecosystem services provided by natural life (e.g., pollination by butterflies and bees), the value of biodiversity for agriculture and medical
research, and the recreational value of observing natural wildlife.
Nonuse value reflects the pure “existence” value of animals or species
(such as the value people place on simply knowing that some polar
bears will survive), and the “option” value of knowing that animals, including some members of endangered species, are available for future
use. Neither use nor nonuse value need be particularly controver57
sial, even from the perspective of committed opponents of animal
rights. If people care about animals and are willing to pay to protect
them, then animals should matter in policy regardless of their moral
status.
The economic approach to valuation of animals raises many questions. Is the value of animals, or species, adequately captured by human willingness to pay for their protection? Imagine a society in
which existence value was effectively zero. We might well reject the
moral judgments of the people in that society and refuse to believe
that those judgments should be the basis for policy and law. Those inclined to accept this objection might nonetheless agree that, when existence value is positive, it should be included in the overall calculus.
But if people’s willingness to pay does not reflect the proper valuation
of animals, it is not easy to identify the proper response. Perhaps the
figures should result from processes of democratic deliberation, not
from market evidence. But whatever its source, any monetary valua57

The idea of existence value raises several puzzles. For example, it makes the
value of an animal or species depend on the human population size. But plausibly that
value, to human beings, does increase with the size of the human population. For a
discussion of other concerns about the concept of existence value, see David A. Dana,
Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 349-53
(2004).
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tion of animals will inevitably be made by human beings. At the very
least, we believe that use, existence, and option value, to the extent
that they can be elicited, are legitimate parts of the climate change
debate, and that they should be incorporated rather than neglected.
Even if this conclusion is accepted, there are severe implementation difficulties in determining the relevant monetary values. As we
shall see, serious efforts have been made to generate monetary figures
for the use value of species. But when the use value of animals is a
public or common good, reliable market mechanisms are unavailable
for translation into monetary benefits. For nonuse value, the ordinary
instrument consists of contingent valuation studies, and we shall make
use of such studies here. But such studies raise many problems and, if
not designed carefully, will produce implausible answers. In the climate change context, the possibility of small errors is especially important: when one is talking about millions of species, even miniscule
changes in the species- or individual-level analysis will lead to dramatic
changes in the estimated social value or cost.
Valuation difficulties of this sort, however, are not reasons for ignoring the relevant costs entirely, particularly when the stakes are
large. Just as scientific uncertainty has been reduced over time, so too
has the conceptual uncertainty about the accuracy of various methods
of nonmarket valuation. If there is a gap in the analysis of climate
change and animals, it is a gap in the literature, not in the availability
of relevant facts or conceptual tools. Our initial submission is that
losses of animal life should play a significant role in the debate. Let us
attempt, then, to make some progress on the question of monetization.
III. THE (ANIMAL) COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
We provide here a tentative estimate of some of the social welfare
costs of climate change on nonhuman life, focusing on human valuations. Because of empirical and conceptual difficulties, we do not in58
sist on any particular figures. Instead, we offer ranges designed to
capture the monetized value of merely one component of social loss:
the loss of endangered species. The foregoing discussion should be

58

Indeed, one of us is generally skeptical of cost-benefit analysis as a decision
mechanism in environmental regulation; the other is a defender of considering the
outcome of that analysis, without making it decisive. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RISK AND REASON, at ix-x (2002) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis should be used
along with other measures to assess the consequences of regulation).
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enough to show that this loss cannot possibly capture the full value of
harms to animals as a result of climate change. If suffering and death
matter, then animals that belong to nonendangered species matter as
well, and the resulting losses will not be included in our analysis. But
monetization of the loss of species presents the more tractable questions, because we have some information about the number of species
at risk and the human valuation of species loss. Our exclusion of animal death and suffering means that our ultimate figures will be far too
low.
We have two minimal goals, one substantive and the other methodological. The first is to show that the numbers are high and that
they need to be considered in assessing the losses from climate
change. The second is to present some of the difficulties—normative,
conceptual, and empirical—involved in assigning monetary values to
those losses.
A. Extinctions
Our analysis focuses, in particular, on the 15%-37% projected ex59
tinction rate noted above. Given the importance of this estimate,
some discussion of its nature and plausibility is warranted. Quantitative projections of the global impact of climate change are necessarily
60
difficult. This is true even of its impact on economic systems, where
data are abundant. But it is even harder for natural systems. The sci61
entific community lacks a clear measure of the number of species,
and determining how each will be affected by climate change is thus a
herculean task. The approach used in extinction studies in biology
focuses on generic species-area relationships (SAR), rather than specific causal mechanisms. The key assumption is that there is a systematic relationship between habitable area and survival. While this
62
method has received some criticism, it is firmly established in the
biological field.

59

Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 145.
See Pounds & Puschendorf, supra note 42, at 108 (noting that models might not
capture key climatic changes).
61
See IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, 2004 IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES: A GLOBAL SPECIES ASSESSMENT 6-9 (Jonathan E.M. Baillie et al. eds., 2004) (noting “the high degree of uncertainty surrounding” the number of species).
62
See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 254-55 (arguing that SAR analyses overstate
the likelihood of extinction); Owen T. Lewis, Climate Change, Species-Area Curves and the
Extinction Crisis, 361 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 163, 164-70 (2006) (discussing
the complications of applying SAR methods to climate change).
60
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This method can be applied to climate change because global
warming has the effect of reducing the habitable area of most species.
Using recently released climate change data, Thomas and his coauthors determine “climate envelope[s]”—climatic conditions under
which particular species can survive—and predict how changes to
63
these envelopes reduce effective habitat size.
These predictions
show that while the climatic stress for any particular animal in any particular year is small, the yearly and global accumulation of habitat loss
leads to massive long-run consequences. If human beings impose a
small stress on the habitat of every animal on the planet, but do so
every year over a period of many decades, many of the animals will
eventually die off.
There are, however, potential problems with our use of the extinction projections from Thomas and his coauthors, and these should be
noted at the outset. First, there is the question of representativeness.
The 1103 species examined by Thomas and his coauthors—while an
immense, joint scientific endeavor—nonetheless represent a miniscule
64
portion of the total number of species. The 20% of the terrestrial
Earth sampled by this study, moreover, might not accurately reflect
the other 80%. But in the absence of good reasons to think that generalization is flawed, reliance on these methods remains plausible. If
we are to make some assumption about the expected losses, it is surely
better to use the best available figure—representativeness concerns
65
acknowledged—than no figure at all.
Second, and even more fundamentally, the 15%-37% extinction
rate gives us no information about the number or distribution of species, or the total number of animals at risk. This information is vital to
a sound analysis, because the absolute number (and characteristics) of
creatures is significant, whether intrinsic or instrumental value is emphasized. Human beings are undoubtedly willing to spend more to
save some species than to save others, and they are more willing to
save large numbers of animals than small numbers. Our own treatment pays no attention to species-specific characteristics (which might
bias our findings upwards or downwards), or to the absolute numbers

63

Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 145.
See Ladle et al., supra note 40, at 799 (noting the limitations of such a small
sample size).
65
A recent study published in Nature suggests that global patterns of species richness are highly correlated across taxons, indicating that representativeness concerns
may not be very significant. John F. Lamoreux et al., Global Tests of Biodiversity Concordance and the Importance of Endemism, 440 NATURE 212, 213 (2006).
64
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of organisms (rather than species). These are, admittedly, serious
omissions on both fronts.
More specific information, however, is difficult to come by. Approximately 1.55 million species have been described and counted to
66
date, but many more remain undiscovered. Projections of the total
67
number of species range from five to fifty million, with a recent study
68
suggesting that a lower figure is possible. In terms of taxonomic distribution, vertebrates comprise a comparatively small 57,739 of the
69
1.55 million known species. The vast majority of species are arthro70
pods —which are a small portion of the Thomas sample (79 of 1103
71
species, 69 of which are butterfly species).
Finally, the absolute
number of animals is virtually impossible to estimate; it is difficult to
estimate population sizes of species that are not known to exist! To
say the least, uncertainty of this sort is important.
A third problem with the 15%-37% figure is that it provides no
guidance as to the timing of extinctions. If we are speaking about human valuations, losing polar bears tomorrow would presumably be
72
worse than losing them a hundred years from now.
But the SAR
models do not estimate the date of extinction, only its inevitability. A
predicted extinction thus might occur tomorrow, in 2050, or in 2100.
Fortunately, the estimation methods we use below partially account for this chronological uncertainty. (The exception is the “use”
value estimate, as we discuss below.) For example, the contingent
valuation results on which we rely ask individuals how much they value
the prevention of a negative change in a threatened species’ population, rather than its immediate extinction. Similarly, the ESA expenditures we use for our “revealed preference” analysis are incurred to

66

IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, supra note 61, at 7 tbl.2.1, 8.
Robert M. May, How Many Species Are There on Earth?, 241 SCIENCE 1441, 1441
(1988).
68
Vojtech Novotny et al., Low Host Specificity of Herbivorous Insects in a Tropical Forest,
416 NATURE 841, 843 (2002) (revising current estimates to approximately five million).
69
IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, supra note 61, at 7 tbl.2.1.
70
Id. (stating that invertebrates account for 1.19 million of the 1.55 million total
known species).
71
Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 146 tbl.2.
72
There is a significant debate, however, as to whether discounting is appropriate
when it comes to human health and life. Presumably, critics would be equally concerned about discounting with animal life. See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108
YALE L.J. 1911, 1912 (1999) (arguing that timing is critical to discounting). For a more
in-depth discussion, see Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Discounting, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (Winter 2007).
67
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prevent population losses and risks of extinction in the future. If we
conceive of the Thomas extinction rates as probabilistic risks that are
imposed today, and find monetary measures that reflect risk rather
than immediate extinction, then the discounting problem fades in
importance. If, for example, people are willing to pay twenty dollars
now to reduce a one in ten thousand risk that will come to fruition in
twenty years, then the resulting figure can be used without discounting.
Fourth, and as we have emphasized, extinction rates ignore the
death and suffering of creatures that do not go extinct. This will serve
to bias our estimates downward, and significantly so. Warming of polar waters will have severe consequences for polar bears, even if it does
not lead to their extinction. An effort to calculate human use and
nonuse value would take account of the relevant losses, to the extent
that people cared about polar bear suffering, independent of extinction risk. Global estimates of the suffering caused by climate change,
73
however, are even harder to come by than death estimates. Such estimates would require close observation of every species, which is obviously not possible when most species have not even been identified.
Finally, the SAR models do not fully account for the expected
74
costs of extreme weather events or abrupt climate change. Again,
this will serve only to bias our results downward.
The upshot of this discussion is that, while there are significant
problems in using the Thomas extinction measure, it remains a useful
foundation for our analysis. If we can obtain a monetary value from
that measure, it will at least identify a component of the social loss
from climate change.
B. Three Assumptions
Before proceeding to our estimates, we describe three additional
assumptions. First, we rely throughout on a low-end assumption about
the total number of species—five million. (This is half the minimum
number cited by Lomborg, for example.) This figure provides a con-

73

E-mail from Chris D. Thomas, Professor of Conservation Biology, Univ. of York,
to Wayne Hsiung (June 2, 2006) (on file with authors).
74
The Thomas model accounts for differences in mean temperature related to
extreme weather events, such as heat waves. It does not, however, account for possible
increases in storm activity, year-to-year temperature variance, and other changes in
climate extremes. Thomas, et al., supra note 5, at 147 (omitting these variables from
the explanation of the climate scenario methodology).
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servative baseline for evaluating the impact of climate change. The
implication is that anywhere from 0.75 to 1.85 million species will be
lost under climate change scenarios by 2050.
Second, for calculations that are sensitive to taxonomic distribution, we assume that all vertebrate species have been identified. Under this assumption, the 57,739 figure cited above exhausts the universe of vertebrate species. The alternative assumption is that
vertebrates comprise the same proportion of unknown as known species. This approach would increase the estimate of vertebrate species
from 57,739 to around 186,000. The real number of vertebrate species is somewhere between these two figures, but probably much
closer to the former, as vertebrate species are more likely to be cur76
rently identified. In order to avoid speculation in an area in which
biologists have little information, we conservatively assume that the
57,739 figure is correct. Relying on the 15%-37% extinction rate, we
thus estimate that anywhere from 8700 to 21,400 vertebrates eventu77
ally will be lost under climate change scenarios by 2050.
Finally, we assume a linear individual and social value function for
species loss in all estimates. If we are valuing animals for their own
sake (i.e., intrinsically), then presumably each animal should count
78
for approximately the same amount as the last. On the other hand,
the correct value or cost function for instrumental value might be
concave or convex, not linear, when it comes to species loss. Concavity would imply diminishing marginal utility for species protection.
For example, if we conceive of species protection as a consumption
good, we might decide, after spending money to protect polar bears
and ring ouzels, that protecting harlequin frogs “just isn’t worth as
much.” Some experimental findings suggest that species protection is
75

See LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 250 (asserting that ten to eighty million species is
the current best estimate).
76
See IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, supra note 61, at 8 (calling vertebrates the
“best evaluated group”).
77
We assume that the extinction rate for fish will be similar to the extinction rates
for other vertebrates. Due to data limitations, Thomas and his coauthors examined
only terrestrial vertebrate species; the impact of climate change on fish and other
aquatic life, however, is not thought to be fundamentally divergent. See, e.g., Catherine
M. O’Reilly et al., Climate Change Decreases Aquatic Ecosystem Productivity of Lake Tanganyika, Africa, 424 NATURE 766, 768 (2003) (concluding that climate change has contributed to the lake’s diminished productivity); Allison L. Perry et al., Climate Change and
Distribution Shifts in Marine Fishes, 308 SCIENCE 1912, 1912 (2005) (predicting that climate changes may strongly influence numbers and distribution of fish).
78
There might be different population sizes across species, of course, but as noted
previously, data on population size is hard to come by.
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a “warm-glow” good—that individuals will pay a fixed amount, and
only that fixed amount, to be part of a “good cause,” regardless of the
79
expected consequences. Convexity, in contrast, would imply increasing marginal costs for species loss. If we conceive of species loss as a
social harm, losing one species might not harm us much—and might
not elicit a high marginal willingness to pay—but losing the millionth
species would leave us in a biological wasteland. It is unclear which
effect should dominate, but we follow a default assumption of linearity. Ideally, contingent value surveys should be able to capture the
curvature of the value or cost function, if any, but no studies to date
that we are aware of have engaged in this line of research.
C. Estimates
We now proceed to our estimation analysis. We report values in
two ways: by 2005 U.S. dollars and by percentage of GDP. The two
measures have independent significance. The former assumes that
real willingness to pay will remain static in perpetuity. The latter implies that species protection will remain a fixed proportion of GDP—
that is, as income grows, willingness to pay will grow proportionately.
Our hunch is that species protection, like health and environmental
protection more generally, will comprise an increasing portion of
GDP, both because species protection is likely to be a “luxury good”
(i.e., we will spend proportionately more on it as our wealth increases), and because species protection becomes more valuable as
more species go extinct. If that is true, then both of our reporting
methods will underestimate true social costs.
1. Use Value Estimates
Ecosystems provide immense value for human use. The air we
breathe, the soil we farm, the plants we harvest, and the water we
drink all depend on ecosystem services. A significant portion of this
value is generated by biological sources.
Two recent studies have estimated the value of natural systems for
human use. First, a 1997 study published in Nature estimated the total
(and largely nonmarket) annual value of ecosystem services to be
around $33 trillion—around twice the value of global GDP at the

79

Tol, supra note 10, at 54-55.
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time. Not all of this is generated by biological sources, but the aggregate value is broken down by categories, such as food production,
gas and climate regulation, water supply, and raw materials.
Previous studies of climate change have accounted for at least
some of this value. For example, virtually every study of climate
change has examined its impact on food production. The categories
relating to natural biological processes, however, have been ignored in
climate change analysis. At least four of these categories—pollination,
biological control, habitat/refugia, and genetic resources—are comprised entirely of natural biological sources.
Table 1: Value of Biological Ecosystem Services to the World

Categories
Pollination
Biological Control
Habitat/Refugia
Genetic Resources
World Total
U.S. Total

81

$US 2005
(in billions)
154
550
164
104
973
280

Summing these four totals, we obtain an annual value of biological
services of $973 billion in 2005 dollars for the world. Using the Thomas extinction estimate of 15%-37%, the projected loss from climate
change is thus $146 to $360 billion in annual value. Excluding habitat/refugia—which is arguably a “nonuse” value—the summed value is
$809 billion in 2005 dollars, and the projected loss range is $121 to
$299 billion. If we assume that the United States receives a proportion
of this use value equal to its proportion of 2005 global GDP, the projected loss for the United States alone ranges from $42 to $103 billion
($35 to $86 billion if habitat/refugia is excluded) annually, or anywhere from 0.4% to 1.1% of annual U.S. GDP (0.4% to 0.9% if habi82
tat/refugia is excluded).
80

Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997).
81
These figures are derived from Costanza et al., supra note 80, at 256 tbl.2.
82
All economic statistics are drawn from the Bureau of Econ. Analysis, National
Income and Product Account Tables, available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/
dn/nipaweb/index.asp (last visited May 1, 2007). The exception is the U.S. share of
global GDP, which is taken from the CIA World Factbook. See CIA—The World
Factbook—United
States,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
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This figure underestimates the true use value of nonhuman life
because many categories of ecosystem services—such as erosion control, soil formation, and nutrient cycling—are of mixed biological and
nonbiological origin.
The second study we use, published in Bioscience in 1997, avoids
this underinclusion problem by breaking down the value of all ecosystem services (including services of mixed biological and nonbiological
origin, such as soil formation) to which biological sources contribute.
The reported annual value of biodiversity for the United States is $389
83
billion in 2005 dollars, and $3.5 trillion for the world.

us.html (last visited May 1, 2007). U.S. GDP percentages are calculated with reference
to the year of the study.
83
Daniel Pimentel et al., Economic and Environmental Benefits of Biodiversity, 47 BIOSCIENCE 747, 748 tbl.2 (1997).
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Table 2: Value of Biodiversity to the United States and the World

84

$US 2005 (in billions)
Categories

US

World

Waste Disposal

75.6

927.2

Soil Formation

6.1

30.5

Nitrogen Fixation

9.8

109.8

Bioremediation of Chemicals

27.5

147.6

Crop Breeding (Genetics)

24.4

140.3

Livestock Breeding (Genetics)

24.4

48.8

Biotechnology

3.1

7.3

Biocontrol of Pests (Crops)

14.6

122.0

Biocontrol of Pests (Forests)

6.1

73.2

Host Plant Resistance (Crops)

9.8

97.6

Host Plant Resistance (Forests)

1.0

13.4

Perennial Grains (Potential)

20.7

207.4

Pollination

48.8

244.0

Fishing

35.4

73.2

Hunting

14.6

30.5

Seafood

3.1

100.0

Other Wild Foods

0.6

219.6

Wood Products

9.8

102.5

Ecotourism

22.0

610.0

Pharmaceuticals from Plants

24.4

102.5

Forests Sequestering of CO2

7.3

164.7

389.2

3572.1

Total

Here, no exclusion is necessary for our estimate, since all of these
values are from biological sources. The projected loss from climate
change is $58 to $144 billion—or 0.6% to 1.4% of GDP—in annual
value for the United States (surprisingly close to the estimate suggested by the Costanza et al. study cited in Table 1), and $539 to
$1322 billion for the world. Our estimates are summarized in Table 3.

84

Table 2 is adapted from id.
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Table 3: Loss in Annual Biodiversity Use Value for the United States

85

World Value
($US 2005,
in billions)

US Value
($US 2005,
in billions)

US
%GDP

Low Climate Change

121

35

0.4

High Climate Change

299

86

0.9

Low Climate Change
(Including Refugia)

146

42

0.4

High Climate Change
(Including Refugia)

360

103

1.1

Pimentel Low Climate Change*

539

58

0.6

1322

144

1.4

Costanza

High Climate Change*

2. Use Value Objections
Three implicit assumptions of our analysis might be challenged.
First, we assume that, in ex ante expectation, threatened species will
not systematically differ in use value from nonthreatened species. It
might be argued, in contrast, that valuable species tend to be more
durable, or more adapted to human society, and thus less susceptible
to damage from climate change. It seems rather unlikely that dogs or
cats will be among the species extinguished by global warming.
While a full empirical defense of this assumption would require an
inquiry beyond the scope of this Article, we believe that our assumption is at least plausible. For one thing, we have no reason to suspect
that value has any inherent correlation with durability or survivability.
Furthermore, value need not imply adaptation to human society; indeed, many currently endangered species, such as some varieties of
salmon and sturgeon, have been overused to the point of threatened
status precisely because of their value.
Second, and as noted above, we assume a linear value function.
That is, the first generic species lost is no more or less valuable, from
an ex ante perspective, than the last. Thus, a 10% loss in species im85

Asterisks indicate best estimate. “Low” and “high” refer to low- and high-end
climate change scenarios for 2050. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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plies a 10% loss in biological use value. Some commentary, in contrast, has suggested that the biodiversity use value function is concave
86
because of redundancies in biological resources. The value of biodiversity, under this view, is not heavily affected by the loss of a particular species, so long as there are biologically and genetically similar organisms that are not lost (i.e., the “genetic distance” between lost and
surviving species is small). For example, we might not care much
about the first 109 species of harlequin frog, if we know that the 110th
will survive.
We have three responses to this objection. First, if threats to biologically similar organisms are correlated, as is surely the case, redundancy need not make the value function concave over its entire domain, but rather simply discrete (e.g., a stepwise function that
increases or decreases only at certain threshold points). So long as we
expect one class of organisms to be no more or less valuable than the
next class, the linear approximation will be valid. Second, more recent commentary has challenged the “genetic distance” approach to
valuing biodiversity because redundancy serves an insurance-like function against catastrophic loss. For example, if some pathogen attacks
harlequin frogs, we will be better off with 110 species than with just
one, since the 110th species will be more likely to have some adaptive
87
characteristic that will allow it to survive the threat. More generally,
the fact that two species are very similar need not make them redundant in value, if the small differences serve some vital function. Finally, to the extent that species are ecologically interdependent, pro88
tection of one species will be required to protect many others. We
acknowledge that if our assumption here is wrong, our figure must be
diminished accordingly.
A third implicit assumption in our analysis is that no adaptive response is possible when a particular species is threatened. It might be
argued, in contrast, that once a valuable species is threatened, human
society will act in an ad hoc fashion to prevent its loss. The difficulty
with this argument is that damage from climate change, unlike other

86

For examples, see Brown & Shogren, supra note 46, at 11; Stephen Polasky &
Andrew R. Solow, On the Value of a Collection of Species, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 298,
298 (1993); Martin Weitzman, On Diversity, 107 Q. J. ECON. 363, 372-73 (1992).
87
See William A. Brock & Anastasios Xepapadeas, Valuing Biodiversity from an Economic Perspective: A Unified Economic, Ecological, and Genetic Approach, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
1597, 1601 (2003) (discussing this scenario as applied to plant life).
88
See Pimentel et al., supra note 83, at 747 (arguing that the loss of a key species
can cause the collapse of an ecosystem).
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human-caused environmental damage, is hard to mitigate on a caseby-case basis. The harlequin frogs discussed in the Introduction provide an example of a species for which mitigation strategies have
89
proven futile. Protecting habitat from human intrusion does little
good if climate change has already undermined the viability of a creature’s habitat, and creating a biosphere or zoo for the world, with controlled environments, is prohibitively costly.
There are three other major sources of error in our estimates.
First, we have failed to account for chronological uncertainty about
species extinction. This is inevitable since, as noted above, the SAR
models provide no guidance about the timing of extinctions. If a species goes extinct in 2100, the loss in use value will be significantly less
than if it goes extinct in 2007. Suppose, as seems plausible, that most
of the extinctions will occur later rather than earlier. If so, the use of
a standard discount rate—say, 3%—will significantly decrease the
monetary figures above. On the other hand, the use of the standard
discount rate is contested, and it is by no means clear that it is appro90
priate.
Second, our absolute value estimates ignore the possibility that
improved technology will either reduce or amplify the value of biodiversity. Both reduction and amplification are possible. If synthetic
substitutes are found, perhaps biodiversity will be less important than
it is now. On the other hand, the progress of genetic research may
mean that we will find more and more valuable uses for biological re91
sources. The GDP measures simply assume that use value will grow
in the same proportion as the other components of GDP, so that a 1%
loss today implies a 1% loss in 2050.
Finally, we assume that extinction is the only harm to global biodiversity. In reality, if 90% of a species’ population is reduced, this will
undermine use value nearly as much as extinction.

89

See Pounds et al., supra note 1, at 161 (noting that harlequin frogs have suffered
widespread decline despite habitat protection).
90
See, e.g., STERN, supra note 10, at 49-59 (providing an overview of the discounting
problem); Ackerman & Finlayson, supra note 23, at 2 (noting debate about the problem and its application); Robert C. Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Decisionmaking, in
DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 173, 176 (Paul R. Portney & John P.
Weyant eds., 1999) (expressing skepticism about the use of the standard discount
rate).
91
See, e.g., Paulo Prada, Poisonous Tree Frog Could Bring Wealth to Tribe in Brazilian
Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at C1 (reporting ways in which frogs can be especially valuable for biotechnological research).
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The first of these three errors suggests overestimation; the second
suggests possible overestimation and possible underestimation; the
third suggests underestimation. For this reason, we lack confidence in
our particular figures. The only unambiguous conclusion is that the
costs of climate change will be seriously underestimated if account is
not taken of the use value of biological resources.
3. Nonuse Value
We offer two strategies for the estimation of nonuse value. First,
we use contingent valuation studies of threatened species to estimate
the monetized welfare costs of species loss from climate change. As we
shall see, this estimation strategy runs into very serious problems, and
one of our goals is to explain those problems. Second, we use expenditures on the ESA as a “revealed preference” measure of species
value. Under both strategies, we offer a range of estimates based on
differing assumptions about the appropriate valuation method.
a. Contingent Valuation: Foundations
Contingent valuation studies directly elicit willingness to pay
92
through surveys that develop a hypothetical market for public goods.
Survey participants are given detailed information about the resource
in question, as well as the nature of the proposed protection. They
are also informed of the consequences of protective inaction—
suffering, population loss, extinction, and so forth. In some instances,
willingness to pay is determined through open-ended inquiry; in others, respondents are given a discrete set of payment choices, or even a
single, referendum-style, yes-or-no choice for a specified dollar
amount.
The virtue of the contingent valuation method is that it provides a
direct measure of human valuation and avoids the potential circularity
of using revealed preferences based on existing regulatory practices.
When the question is, “What amount should be spent to protect animals?” it seems most sensible to elicit people’s judgments and not to
rely on current regulatory expenditures. The current expenditures
might very well be too low, because of collective-action problems in
political action, or too high, because of interest group pressures. On

92

For an overview of contingent valuation methodology, see ROBERT CAMERON
MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2-4 (1989).
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the other hand, contingent valuation methods might be problematic
because of “protest” valuations, framing problems, or other cognitive
93
defects. We shall explore some of these problems in the context of
climate change.
Even with these concerns, a well-designed contingent valuation
study may turn out to be the best or only available method for measur94
ing nonuse values. In the area of species loss, two major contingent
valuation surveys have examined individual willingness to pay. The
first, by David Pearce, provides values for ten major threatened species
95
in the United States using seven source studies. Pearce’s results are
displayed in Table 4.
Table 4: Contingent Value of Species Protection (Pearce)

Species
Bald Eagle
Bighorn Sheep
Blue Whale
Bottlenose Dolphin
Emerald Shiner
Grizzly Bear
Humpback Whale
Northern Elephant Seal
Sea Otter
Whooping Crane
Total
Per species
Total (No Humpback)
Per species (No Humpback)

93

Annual value
per person
($US 2005)
18.48
12.81
13.86
10.43
6.71
27.57
65.56
12.07
12.07
1.79
181.33
18.13
115.77
12.86

For further discussion of potential problems with the contingent valuation
method, see CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed.,
1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1994, at 45, 62-63; Daniel Kahneman &
Jack L. Knetsch, Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 57, 68-69 (1992); Daniel McFadden, Contingent Valuation and Social
Choice, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 689, 706-07 (1994).
94
DAVID W. PEARCE, ECONOMIC VALUES AND THE NATURAL WORLD 116 (1993).
95
Id. at 74-77.
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A more recent study by John Loomis and Douglas White surveyed
twenty contingent valuation studies and provided values for seventeen
96
threatened species. In Table 5, where multiple estimates for a species are provided by Loomis and White, we use the average value. We
also convert their one-time, lump-sum valuations into annual values
(using a 10% discount rate), for the purpose of making apples-toapples comparisons in our analysis.
Table 5: Contingent Value of Species Protection (Loomis and White)

Species
Arctic Grayling/
Cutthroat Trout
Atlantic Salmon
Bald Eagle
Bighorn Sheep
Gray Wolf
Grey Whale
Grizzly Bear
Humpback Whale
Monk Seal
Northern Spotted Owl
Pacific Salmon/Steelhead
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker
Sea Otter
Sea Turtle
Squawfish
Striped Shiner
Whooping Crane
Total
Per Species

Annual value per
Annual value per
household ($US 2005) person ($US 2005)
2.03

0.79

10.80
32.40
28.35
9.05
35.10
62.10
23.36
16.20
94.50
85.05
17.55
39.15
17.55
10.80
8.10
47.25
539.33
31.73

4.20
12.61
11.03
3.52
13.66
24.16
9.09
6.30
36.77
33.09
6.83
15.23
6.83
4.20
3.15
18.39
209.85
12.34

One striking fact about these two surveys is that they imply relatively similar per-species valuations. Dividing the per-household
measure from Loomis and White by the average size of a household

96

John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered Species: Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197, 199 (1996).
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97

(2.57 people) leads to a per-species estimate of approximately $12.34
per person annually—compared to the $18 per-person measure from
Pearce. Moreover, if the humpback whale outlier is removed from the
98
Pearce survey, as Pearce himself suggests ought to be done, his survey’s average drops to $12.86 per person—virtually identical to the
$12.34 result found by Loomis and White. While there is some overlap in the contingent valuation source studies surveyed by Pearce and
99
by Loomis and White, the fact that the per-species estimates are similar in magnitude, and not extremely sensitive to the particular species
surveyed, is a comforting feature of the data. Contingent valuation
methods seem to be arriving at consistent average values.
On the other hand, there are also some troubling irregularities.
For example, the whooping crane is valued at $1.79 in Pearce, but an
order of magnitude more ($18.39 per person) in Loomis and White.
Similarly, the estimated values in both studies exceed the amounts ac100
tually expended by respondents on conservation.
This fact, however, is consistent with a collective-action problem, and does not necessarily demonstrate an erroneous methodology. Finally, there is a
strong possibility of reporting bias: researchers are probably more
likely to conduct surveys for high-value than for low-value species. Indeed, two of the twenty-one species surveyed (the steelhead and the
red-cockaded woodpecker) are among the ten most costly species in
101
2004 ESA expenditures.
One final note should be made about this data. The studies surveyed by Pearce and by Loomis and White offered a variety of different population-change scenarios in their queries. For example, many
of the surveys were framed in terms of gain to an endangered popula102
tion, rather than avoidance of extinction.
In contrast, our analysis
assumes that all elicited valuations are tied to extinction. Since valuations for extinction would presumably be higher than valuations for
97

Average size of household is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2005 Current
Population Survey, available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/
hh6.pdf.
98
Pearce, supra note 94, at 76 tbl.5.
99
Three of the seven surveys used by Pearce, supra note 94, at 76-77, are also used
by Loomis & White, supra note 96, at 200 tbl.2.
100
Pearce, supra note 94, at 75.
101
See infra Table 6.
102
Indeed, it is well established that people attach higher values to losses than to
gains, which would affect the results of contingent valuation studies. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 278 (1979).
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population loss or gain without extinction, our estimates of the cost of
103
climate change will be biased downward.
b. Contingent Value: Estimates
We now proceed to our estimation analysis. We merge the Pearce
data with the Loomis and White data, using mean values where species
are examined in both studies, to arrive at an annual per-person will104
ingness to pay of $11.84 for a generic species.
The obvious way to
use this data is to multiply a society’s total willingness to pay to protect
a species by the expected loss of 0.75 to 1.85 million species. Using
population figures from the 2000 census, we find an astronomical
range estimate of $2499 trillion to $6164 trillion in annual costs for
the United States! Of course, this number should not be trusted. The
most obvious reason is that the vast majority of the 0.75 to 1.85 million
species anticipated to be lost due to climate change are arthropods
(such as insects). In contrast, the contingent value studies generally
focus on vertebrates such as mammals and birds. Presumably, most
people will value vertebrates more highly than, say, butterflies and
beetles.
An alternative estimation method would thus exclude all nonvertebrate species, on the assumption that human beings are not willing
to pay anything for them. With that exclusion, the threatened loss is
8700 to 21,400 species. The range estimate drops considerably but is
still implausibly high—$29 to $71 trillion in annual costs, or anywhere
from three to seven times annual GDP. This number also raises a serious difficulty: would U.S. citizens be willing to pay multiples of their
current income to protect any number of species?
One likely problem here involves a reporting bias: species examined by contingent valuation surveys might not be representative of
species that are not so examined. We adjust our estimate for this possibility in the following way. First, we determine a mean ESA expenditure for the fifteen domestic endangered species in our surveys. We
then de-bias our estimate by using ESA expenditures as a baseline.
The key assumption underlying this method is that the distribution of
ESA expenditures across species roughly captures the distribution of

103

Only seventeen of the forty-three total queries were framed in terms of extinction loss. See Loomis & White, supra note 96, at 200 tbl.2.
104
We exclude the humpback whale outlier, as suggested by Pearce, supra note 94,
at 76 tbl.15.
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social value. Table 6 provides the resulting species-specific expenditure data.
Table 6: ESA Expenditures on Surveyed Species

Species
Atlantic Salmon
Bald Eagle
Bighorn Sheep
Blue Whale
Gray Wolf
Grizzly Bear
Humpback Whale
Monk Seal
Northern Spotted Owl
Pacific Salmon/Steelhead
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker
Sea Otter
Sea Turtle
Squawfish
Whooping Crane
Total
Average
Total (No Steelhead)
Average (No Steelhead)
Average (All Species in ESA) 105
Bias factor (No Steelhead)

ESA Expenditures
($US 2005,
in thousands)
7496
9837
714
67
6662
7742
666
2321
6980
117,380
14,125
734
28,868
5732
1757
211,081
14,072.07
93,701
6693
592
11.3

An obvious outlier in this data is the steelhead, which at $117 million exceeds the next highest species by an order of magnitude. In
contrast, the contingent valuation data shows that the steelhead is valued highly—the second highest in our sample—but certainly not as
highly as suggested by its ESA expenditures. We thus drop the steelhead from our analysis.
Excluding the steelhead, we calculate a bias multiple of 11.3. That
is, the representative species from our sample is approximately 11.3
times more valuable than the mean endangered species. Dividing our
estimates of the harm of climate change by this value leads us to a re105

The average here differs from the average ESA cost reported below because we
exclude non-species-specific expenditures.
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vised cost range from $2.6 to $6.3 trillion in annual value, or anywhere
from 27% to 66% of GDP. Our results are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7: Total Contingent Value of Species Loss ($US 2005, in trillions)
Low Climate
Change

High Climate
Change

2499

6164

Estimated Costs
(Vertebrates Only)

29

71

Estimated Costs
(Vertebrates Only,
Adjusted for Reporting Bias)

2.6

6.3

27%

66%

Estimated Costs

%GDP

106

Even these adjusted estimates should be taken with many grains of
salt. As noted above, contingent valuation methods are plagued by
various anomalies. Perhaps most important is what Daniel Kahneman
and Jack Knetsch describe as the “embedding effect”—the tendency
for elicited valuations to remain relatively similar across surveys, even
where theory would predict dramatic differences in willingness to
107
pay. One manifestation of this effect is the insensitivity of valuations
to the size of a prospective harm; surveys often elicit similar values
from respondents, whether 1, 10, or 100 units of a particular good are
108
the subject of inquiry.
If a contingent valuation survey were commissioned to examine popular willingness to pay for 10 species, it
might very well obtain values identical to the value we use for a single
species. This, of course, would greatly undermine our linear aggregation method. We strongly suspect that an exercise in multiplication,
based on existing data, will far exceed people’s actual willingness to
pay.
For this reason, we do not believe that our estimate accurately captures human valuations, even in a first-best world where collectiveaction problems are eliminated. To say the least, people are unlikely
to devote nearly all of GDP, and much less a multiple of GDP, to the
106

Calculated relative to a 1995 baseline (the year of the Loomis study) from Bureau of Econ. Analysis, supra note 82.
107
Kahneman & Knetsch, supra note 93, at 58-60.
108
See, e.g., William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with
Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 93, at 91, 94 fig.9.
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protection of nonhuman life. Opponents of contingent valuation will
see our results as confirming evidence for the implausibility of the
method; advocates will urge more careful and contextually sensitive
inquiries.
We offer a third possibility: instead of interpreting the contingent
valuation results as actual willingness to pay, we might instead understand them as suggestive that people are in fact committed to the intrinsic value of nonhuman life—that is, the welfare of animals for their
own sake. Surely human society would pay many multiples of GDP to
prevent human extinction. And some surveys suggest that individual
Americans value foreign human suffering by an order of magnitude
109
more than what the United States actually expends to alleviate it.
The fact that the United States does not spend as much as its people
state they would prefer for such causes—whether human or nonhuman—does not necessarily undermine the elicited figure as a normative matter, even if it does undermine it as a descriptive matter.
In short, at this point, our conclusion is lamentably vague: Americans are willing to spend a great deal to protect endangered species—
and hence nonuse value, once properly monetized, is quite large.
c. Revealed Preference
An alternative and less troublesome strategy for estimating nonuse
value is to use data on current ESA expenditures to protect threatened
animals. A significant advantage of this data is that it reduces the
problem just mentioned; that is, the aggregate figure is alert to a
budget constraint, and in that sense it is much more realistic than a
figure that emerges from aggregating willingness to pay for each individual species, taken one at a time.
Federal and state government expenditures on the ESA in 2004
were approximately $1.4 billion, and were used to protect 1340 enti-

109

In a poll of Americans’ preferences for the percentage of the federal budget to
be expended on foreign aid, Stephen Kull found that the mean response was 14%. In
fact, the federal government devotes less than 1% of its budget to aid. PROGRAM ON
INT’L POL’Y ATTITUDES, AMERICANS ON FOREIGN AID AND WORLD HUNGER: A STUDY OF
U.S. PUBLIC ATTITUDES 8 (2001), available at http://65.109.167.118/pipa/
pdf/feb01/ForeignAid_Feb01_rpt.pdf. This study must, however, be taken with a
grain of salt; it is possible that people would want many uses of the federal budget—
education, environmental protection, national defense, basic research—to exceed
their current support levels, producing an implausibly high aggregate figure.
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110

ties.
(“Entity” and “species” have slightly different meanings in the
ESA, but the differences are not significant for the purposes of our
111
analysis. ) In contrast, expenditures in 1994 were only $245 million.
While part of the reason for this vast jump is the use of a different,
112
and more expansive, measure for expenditures starting in 2001,
there is nonetheless a clear and steady trend of increased expenditures over the past decade. The seven-year period from 1994 to 2000
saw an approximate 150% nominal increase; the period from 2002 to
2004 (under the new measure of expenditures) saw an approximate
19% increase. (The year 2001 was an outlier in the general trend,
113
with $2.4 billion in expenditures. )
Part of the reason for this expenditure trend is an increase in the
number of listed species. In 1994, there were 914 listed organisms;
there was thus a 47% increase in listed endangered or threatened species over the examined period. The per-species average, however, has
jumped far more than 47%—from $0.27 million per species in 1994 to
114
$1.05 million in 2004, a 290% increase.
There are at least two economic explanations for this increase. First, as social wealth increases,
demand for species protection will increase, especially if environmental protection is a “luxury” good. Second, as more species go extinct, preservation of a marginal species might be deemed more important. It is also possible, of course, that the increase is simply the
115
result of changing moral commitments or interest group politics.

110

The operational categories for expenditures at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service include fisheries, refuge, land acquisition, law enforcement, research, listing, and
consultation, among others. State agencies do not have the same formal categories,
but they undertake similar activities. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 3.
111
“Entity” is a narrower category than “species,” so a single species might be represented by multiple entities in the endangered species list. Id. at 2. The per-species
values we report, therefore, will be underestimates.
112
In particular, nonspecific expenditures were recorded beginning in 2001. Id.
113
Id. at 7 tbl.c.
114
Id.
115
Public choice dynamics, however, could cut in the other direction as well.
Widespread but relatively weak preferences generally lead to collective-action problems
in the provision of public goods. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 165-67 (1971) (arguing that
large groups of individuals with little to gain are unlikely to act together). If collectiveaction problems in protecting endangered species are significant, then our revealedpreference measure will significantly underestimate the true value of such protection.
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Table 8: Federal and State Expenditures on ESA (Nominal Dollars)
Year

Expenditures
(in millions)

Listed
Entities

Per Species
Average (in millions)

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

245
298
286
301
454
514
610
2442
1192
1201
1412

914
957
963
1111
1166
1202
1235
1272
1285
1335
1340

0.27
0.31
0.30
0.27
0.39
0.43
0.49
1.92
0.93
0.90
1.05

116

The expenditure data can be used directly to estimate a social cost
for species loss from climate change (note that we are dealing here
with the costs to Americans alone, which will bias our estimates downward). Current expenditures on endangered species act as a (mini117
mum) revealed preference for species loss more generally.
Following Randy Simmons and Kimberly Frost, we assume that the true cost
of the ESA (including compliance and opportunity costs) is sixfold
nominal government expenditures, making the 2004 per-species value
118
approximately $6.32 million.
This is a conservative multiple; compliance costs in environmental regulation often dominate direct gov119
ernment expenditures by an order of magnitude or more.

116

Table 8 is derived from U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.C.
See Don Coursey, The Revealed Demand for a Public Good: Evidence from Endangered
and Threatened Species, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 411, 413-14 (1997) (using public expenditures on endangered species to assess the “‘revealed public demand” for each species).
118
See SIMMONS & FROST, supra note 12, at 16 (determining that actual expenditures were four times that reported by the government).
119
The exact multiple is likely to vary significantly on a case-by-case basis; we proceed merely on the assumption that there is a rough correlation between government
expenditures and total social costs. It is worth noting, however, that the sixfold multiple is probably very conservative. The Bonneville Power Administration, in California,
estimated that its compliance costs (including the opportunity cost of lost power revenues) with regulations governing a single species of salmon were approximately $350
million in 1994 (compared to the mere $245 million in total expenditures reported for
all species and government entities in that same year). Compare Brown & Shogren, supra note 46, at 13, with U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.C. Similarly,
regulations protecting the California coastal gnatcatcher will likely lead to compliance
117
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We first estimate the cost of climate change with no adjustments
for taxonomic distribution. The $6.32 million per-species revealed
preference from 2004 implies a range estimate of $4.9 to $12.0 trillion
annually. A serious criticism of this estimate is that it fails to account
for the fact that ESA expenditures are distributed unevenly. The top
100 species account for almost 90% of the government expenditures,
120
and the top 50 account for a little more than 75%.
Presumably, opportunity and compliance costs would be similarly proportioned. As
long as the taxonomic distribution of species threatened by climate
change is the same as the distribution of currently listed endangered
species, this should not be a problem. However, this is unlikely to be
the case, as arthropods make up the vast majority of existing species
but a relatively small portion of the ESA’s list, and an even smaller
121
portion of the top 100.
Thus, a more plausible estimate focuses on vertebrate species. In
Table 9, we break down expenditures by taxonomy and calculate a
value for per-vertebrate loss. Notably, as with the vertebrate analysis
using the contingent valuation method, we ignore impacts on nonvertebrate life. This will serve to bias our estimate downward.

and opportunity costs of up to $5 billion in the period from 2003 to 2020. DAVID L.
SUNDING, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION FOR THE COASTAL
CALIFORNIA GNATCATCHER, at ii (2003), available at http://www.calresources.org/
CRMICHGnatcatcherAnalysis.pdf. Total government expenditures, in contrast, were
only around $1.4 million in 2004—suggesting up to a 294:1 ratio of true costs to expenditures. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.C. While the species
that have been examined carefully for total social costs are unlikely to be perfectly representative, they are at least suggestive of the likely average ratio.
120
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 51-54 tbl.2.
121
It is worth noting, however, that two arthropods do make the ESA top 100 list.
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Table 9: ESA Revealed Preference by Taxon

Taxonomy
Mammals
Birds
Reptiles
Amphibians
Fish
Total
Total
(No Fish)

No. of
Species

2004
Expenditures
($US 2004,
millions)

2004
%
Share

2004
Expenditures
(Adjusted)

Per
Species
Social
Cost 122

86
98
40
19
142
384

122
103
42
8
475
750

0.15
0.13
0.05
0.01
0.60
0.94

208
176
72
14
810
1280

14.51
10.75
10.74
4.31
34.22
19.98

243

275

0.34

470

11.58

Table 9 summarizes per-species values by vertebrate taxon. An obvious outlier is fish, where the annual per-species revealed social value
is a whopping $34 million—arguably the result of mixed use and non123
use value.
One might question why commercial fish interests would
lobby for endangered species protection rather than direct subsidies.
We nonetheless calculate net social values both including and excluding fish. The results, which are not vastly divergent, are reported in
Table 10.
Table 10: Costs of Climate Change to the U.S.: Revealed124Preference
($US 2005, in billions; %GDP in parentheses)

Costs (No Exclusion)
Costs (No Arthropods)
Costs (No Fish)*

122

Low Climate Change

High Climate Change

4882 (39.5%)
179 (1.4%)
104 (0.8%)

12,043 (96.9%)
439 (3.5%)
255 (2.1%)

6x multiple, $US 2004, in millions.
A representative of the National Marine Fisheries Service offered three explanations for the unusually high expenditures on fish. First, many fish species have significant commercial value. Second, fish species often serve as indicators (“canaries”)
for the health of aquatic ecosystems. Protecting fish therefore implicitly entails protecting many other aquatic species. Third, fish implicate many diverse sectors of the
economy—fisheries, hydropower, and even the timber industry. Email from Marta
Nammack, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., to Wayne Hsiung (Sept. 8, 2006) (on file with
authors).
124
Asterisk indicates best estimate.
123
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The estimated cost including fish ranges from $179 to $439 billion
annually, or 1.4% to 3.5% of GDP. The estimated range excluding
fish, which should be viewed as the best estimate, is $104 to $255 billion, or 0.8% to 2.1% of GDP. Again, since both of these estimates exclude all nonvertebrate life, they should be viewed with skepticism.
Downwardly biased as they are, the minimum values of these ranges
are nonetheless very high—$104 billion is nearly as high as the pro125
jected annual abatement costs of the Kyoto Protocol.
D. Summary and Caveats
Our best estimate of the total cost of climate change in terms of
species loss, including both use and nonuse values, is $162 to $399 billion, or 1.4% to 3.5% of GDP, using the revealed preference method.
The range variance is driven by uncertainty in the global temperature
projections. Thus, we can move from the high end of these cost esti126
mates to the low end, if climate change is mitigated.
Table 11: Net Costs of Climate Change for the United States
($US 2005, in billions; %GDP in parentheses)
Low Climate Change

High Climate Change

Use

58 (0.6%)

144 (1.4%)

Revealed Preference (RP)

104 (0.8%)

255 (2.1%)

Contingent Value (CV)

2565 (27%)

6310 (66%)

Total (Use + RP)

162 (1.4%)

399 (3.5%)

Total (Use + CV)

2623 (27.6%)

6454 (67.4%)

We can now take a fresh look at the costs and benefits of the Kyoto
127
Protocol.
While there is significant debate over the effectiveness of

125

See Terry Barker & Paul Ekins, The Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy, 25 ENERGY J.
53, 69-70 (2004) (finding that the costs to the United States of the Kyoto Protocol
would have been less than 1% of GDP); William D. Nordhaus, Global Warming Economics, 294 SCIENCE 1283, 1284 (2001) (estimating that the United States would have incurred annual abatement costs of $125 billion if it had joined the Kyoto Protocol).
126
An approximately 1.2°C mitigation in expected climate change will move us
from the high climate change scenario to the low climate change scenario.
127
We focus exclusively on the most commonly cited version of the Protocol,
which allows permit trading between “Annex I” (largely high income) countries. Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
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Kyoto, some estimates anticipate mitigation of approximately 0.15°C
128
by 2100.
Nordhaus and Boyer have suggested that mitigation might
be as low as 0.03°C, as fossil fuel emissions shift to developing countries. The costs of Kyoto are similarly disputed, but most models suggest annual costs of anywhere from 0% to 4% of GDP, with a value in
129
the lower end of that range (less than 1%) being most plausible.
Nordhaus, a treaty skeptic, most recently estimated annual abatement
130
costs of $125 billion for the United States —$186 billion in 2005 dollars—compared to the $18 billion estimated benefit. (For comparative purposes, the U.S. budget for national defense is over $400 billion
131
annually. )
If species loss (not animal loss as a whole) is included, the calculus
is significantly changed. Using the revealed preference measure of
willingness to pay, we estimate that if the Kyoto Protocol reduces
warming by 0.15°C, it would buy around $30 billion in annual savings,
relative to its worst-case $186 billion annual cost. Even under the most
conservative cost-benefit assumptions, the impact of climate change
on nonhuman life alone justifies almost one-sixth of the costs of the

128

Parry and his coauthors estimate 0.15°C mitigation. The World Energy Council
also predicts 0.15°C mitigation. Nordhaus and Boyer, in contrast, suggest 0.13°C in an
initial paper, but predict a mere 0.03°C in mitigation in their latest models. See Martin
Parry et al., Buenos Aires and Kyoto Targets Do Little To Reduce Climate Change Impacts, 8
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 285, 286 (1998) (estimating that the relative warming by 2100
would be 2.54°C if left unmitigated, but would be 2.39°C if mitigated under Kyoto);
Michael Jefferson, Deputy Sec’y Gen., World Energy Council, Keynote Address to the
31st Conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.: Global Warming and
Global Energy After Kyoto, chart 8 (Apr. 20, 1998), available at
http://www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/default/archives/speeches/
spc980420MJb.asp (graphing the projected effect of Kyoto on global mean temperature and estimating an approximately 0.15°C mitigating effect by 2100); William
Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol,
ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE), 93, 104 (1999) (projecting a 0.13°C mitigation); NORDHAUS & BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD, supra note 7, at 152 (projecting a 0.03°C mitigation).
129
For a survey of various models, see Barker & Ekins, supra note 125, at 55-70. See
also LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 303 (mentioning the many models of Kyoto that have
been developed and how they “generally found much the same picture in relative
terms”); Nordhaus, supra note 125, at 1283 (noting both the challenges of modeling
agreements such as Kyoto and the various models that have been developed, and
choosing to apply an updated regional integrated model of climate and the economy
in analyzing Kyoto).
130
See Nordhaus, supra note 125, at 1284.
131
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), NATIONAL DEFENSE
BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2006, at 5 tbl.1-2 (Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_greenbook.pdf.
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132

Kyoto Protocol for the United States.
Because of its low anticipated
value for the United States, the Kyoto Protocol nonetheless continues
to impose costs in excess of benefits. But it is noteworthy that the costbenefit calculus is improved significantly by the inclusion of nonhuman life.
The picture for the rest of the world is better. While both our
contingent value and revealed preference data are drawn from U.S.
sources, we can make a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the rest of
the world by using the United States’s proportion of global GDP as a
133
scaling factor. The predicted value of the Kyoto Protocol in protecting natural biological systems is $74 billion for the rest of the world,
making the total value of the Protocol approximately $78 billion in to134
tal.
The net value of the treaty for the world, however, is still negative, at –$77 billion annually, given the heavy U.S. costs.
Table 12: Value of the Kyoto Protocol
($US 2005, in billions annually)
US Value (No Animals)
US Savings from Protection of Animals
US Total
Rest of World Value (No Animals)
Rest of World Savings from Protection of Animals
Rest of World Total
World Total (Including US)

-185
30
-155
4
74
78
-77

It is worth reiterating that our estimates of the cost of climate
change include a number of conservative assumptions. First and most
notably, we have ignored any impacts of climate change short of extinction. In reality, both the use and nonuse value of nonhuman life
will be dramatically affected by declines in population and suffering
independent of extinction. Even species that survive will face habitat
loss of up to 85% under high-end climate change scenarios—with

132

Under the low, 0.03°C mitigation scenario suggested by Nordhaus and Boyer,
the Protocol would buy the U.S. $6 billion in annual value.
133
The key assumption in this calculation is that the rest of the world is willing to
spend to protect nonhuman life in proportion to its GDP.
134
We use Nordhaus and Boyer’s 2000 data for our calculations of the benefits
value of the Kyoto Protocol to the United States and the world. See NORDHAUS &
BOYER, supra note 7, at 145-68.
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135

population declines of similar magnitude.
One could plausibly amplify all of our cost estimates by a substantial figure on this basis. At
first glance, an 85% multiplier might be a place to start. To the extent
that people place a special premium on the loss of species, however,
that figure is likely to be far too high. Nonetheless, an estimate of willingness to pay for the loss of many millions of animals would undoubtedly produce substantial figures. And if human willingness to
pay does not adequately capture that loss—as we believe—then such
an estimate is itself likely to be far too low.
Second, our reported “best estimates” of nonuse value have neglected nonvertebrate life entirely. This is necessary because of data
limitations. Contingent valuation studies tend to examine charismatic
mammals and birds rather than insects or plants. The ESA expenditures we use for revealed preference analysis cluster around a similar
set of organisms. Nonvertebrates nonetheless account for approxi136
mately 5% of total ESA expenditures. It might be reasonable, therefore, to increase our nonuse estimates by that factor.
Third, we have made a number of assumptions that have an unquantifiable but downward impact on cost estimates. For example:
We assume a low-end value for the number of species and the number
of vertebrates. We ignore the impact of a possible increase in extreme
weather events. And we do not even attempt to quantify the risk of
catastrophic ecosystem destruction stemming from abrupt climate
change. All of these factors will serve to bias our estimates downward.
Fourth, in our evaluation of Kyoto, we ignore the potential learning value of the Protocol in establishing a test case and framework for
future international agreements on climate change. Indeed, if we
conceive of Kyoto as the first step in a series of progressively steeper
greenhouse gas reductions (eventually applying to developing as well
as developed countries), evaluating the agreement’s costs and benefits
137
on the margin might be inappropriate.
On the other hand, there are some reasons to think that our estimates of the cost of climate change might be biased upward. First, we

135

E-mail from Chris D. Thomas, Professor of Conservation Biology, Univ. of York,
to Wayne Hsiung (June 22, 2006) (on file with authors).
136
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 9-49 tbl.1 (tabulating FY 2004
expenditures for all endangered and threatened species).
137
Nordhaus concedes the learning value of the Protocol. See Nordhaus, supra
note 125, at 1284 (noting that “the major merit of [Kyoto] is that it is the first experiment with market instruments in a truly global environmental agreement,” thus making it a potentially “useful if expensive guinea pig”).
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assume that individuals in the United States value unknown and foreign wildlife as much as they value domestic wildlife. Revealed preference analysis suggests dramatic differences in the value of domestic
138
versus foreign human lives. Might the same be true for animals?
Since the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has no jurisdiction over
foreign wildlife, we cannot compare expenditures for domestic and
foreign species in any precise fashion. We offer two reasons, however,
to think that the difference between domestic and foreign species
value may be smaller than anticipated. First, modern human life is so
detached from wildlife that, to the vast majority of individuals, a domestic endangered species is as “foreign” as a nondomestic one. For
example, among the top ten most valuable species, as measured by
ESA expenditures, are the red-cockaded woodpecker, pallid sturgeon,
139
and right whale.
Are such species any less “foreign” than polar
140
bears or giant pandas? Second, if there is a difference, it is not even
clear which way the foreign/domestic distinction should cut. Foreign
and exotic species (tigers, elephants, etc.) might very well be more
prized, precisely because of their rarity on U.S. lands. Indeed, public
and private organizations in the United States spend many millions of
dollars annually on a handful of foreign giant pandas, possibly making
the panda the most valued endangered species, on a per-animal basis,
141
in this country.
A second possible source of upward bias is our failure to discount.
As a result of scientific uncertainty in the SAR models, we cannot discount use value with any degree of accuracy. And in our analysis of
nonuse value, we assume that there are no significant timing differences between extinction caused by climate change and other sources,
such as habitat loss.
138

See Wojciech Kopszuk et al., The Limitations of Decentralized World Redistribution:
An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 EUR. ECON. REV. 1051, 1051 (2005) (estimating, by
revealed preference, that some foreign lives, from the point of view of the United
States, are valued at as little as 1/2000th the value of domestic lives).
139
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 6 tbl.B.
140
To be sure, this would not be true of some forms of use value. However, our
use value calculations do not depend on the foreign/domestic distinction, since we are
not using a species multiple.
141
See Brenda Goodman, Eats Shoots, Leaves and Much of Zoos’ Budgets, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2006, at A1 (noting that, in addition to expensive upkeep costs, Zoo Atlanta
pays a $2 million annual fee to the Chinese government “essentially to rent a pair of
giant pandas”); Lynne Warren, Panda, Inc., NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, July 2006, at 42, 48
(stating that there are eleven pandas in the United States, spread out over four zoos,
and that “[h]osting giant pandas costs each zoo an average of 2.6 million dollars a
year,” a figure that can balloon up to $4 million with the addition of two cubs).
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Third, we treat our measures of use and nonuse value as conceptually independent when, in fact, there might be significant overlap—
142
for example, the high ESA expenditures to protect threatened fish.
This is not a serious problem for the contingent valuation analysis,
since the use value is trivial relative to our calculated nonuse values.
However, our central revealed preference estimate would be significantly reduced—up to 50%—by any redundancy in use and nonuse
value.
Finally, we should note again that we assume a linear value or cost
function for species loss. In reality, there are probably ranges of convexity and concavity. The recent and vast increases in per-species expenditures under the ESA suggest that we are currently in a range of
convexity. But at some point well short of 100% of GDP, society would
presumably decide to stop paying for species protection, or at least
143
significantly reduce its marginal willingness to pay.
CONCLUSION
Our principal goal in this Article has been to suggest that climate
change threatens to kill countless animals, and that their suffering and
death should matter to climate change policy. By all estimates, climate change is causing, and will cause, a massive loss of animal life
and will produce a great deal of suffering. An adequate accounting of
the costs of climate change must consider these effects.
At the same time, we have attempted to explore some of the complexities in assigning monetary values to species and animals. We have
distinguished between two overlapping but independent sets of losses:
extinction of species and harms done to particular animals. Both of
these losses should be included in the overall calculation. Because of
limitations in existing data, we have focused only on the loss of species, with the belief that this loss is an important component of the
problem.
On the basis of current climate change projections, a plausible
and conservative range estimate of lost use values, for the world as a
whole, is from $0.5 to $1.3 trillion annually. A plausible and conserva-

142

Of course, we exclude fish from our revealed preference analysis. However, it
might be the case that commercial interests are important in other instances.
143
Putting the disputed nature of animal rights aside, this will be true due to income effects. That is, if society were actually spending a significant portion of GDP to
protect animals, total social wealth would be reduced. And at reduced wealth levels,
demand for all goods and services will decrease.
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tive estimate of lost nonuse values, for the world as a whole, is from
$0.6 to $1.5 trillion annually. For the United States, the corresponding figures are $58 to $144 billion in lost use value and $104 to $255
billion in lost nonuse value. We have argued, moreover, that these estimates might be downwardly biased because we ignore harms short of
extinction, ignore impacts on nonvertebrate life, and fail to account
for a possible increase in extreme weather events. On the other hand,
our estimates might be upwardly biased because we fail to examine the
distributional mix of threatened species (for example, foreign versus
domestic), we do not even attempt to discount, and we treat our
measures of use and nonuse value as completely nonredundant. Finally, there is a serious and unanswered question about the curvature
of the species value function. Our estimates, therefore, are necessarily
tentative.
We have nonetheless used our analysis to take a fresh look at the
costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol. If the Kyoto Protocol reduces warming by 0.15°C, we have estimated that its benefits, for
Americans, increase by $30 billion annually, and for the world by $74
billion annually, with the major caveat that these savings might not be
sustained without a permanent and long-term solution to climate
change. Wider and deeper restrictions on greenhouse gases—for example, those that include developing countries, above all China, a
growing contributor—would deliver correspondingly larger benefits.
Our central claim here is that, for too long, the debate over climate change policy has been conducted without paying significant attention to nonhuman life. In our view, animals have intrinsic value,
and that value should be included in any judgment about appropriate
regulation. But our emphasis has been on existing human valuations,
not on abstract claims about the appropriate treatment of species and
individual animals. To that extent we bracket some of the most controversial claims about animal welfare. If regulators attend to human
valuations of nonhuman life, they will find that existing estimates of
the costs of climate change are far too low.

